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ESSAY 
 
THE INCOHERENCE OF MARITAL BENEFITS 
ROBIN L. WEST† 
INTRODUCTION 
En route to finding the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) an unconsti-
tutional violation of the Fifth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause, the 
Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Windsor v. United States1 gave short 
shrift to one of Congress’s primary arguments in defense of the Act: that 
the federal government has a compelling interest in limiting federal mar-
riage benefits to opposite-sex couples because traditional marriage has the 
laudable purpose—or function—of channeling the heterosexual sex that 
creates children into a way of life that provides the optimal environment for 
the rearing of those children.2 In other words, DOMA aims to minimize 
irresponsible heterosexual sex and procreation, thereby limiting the number 
of children born outside of marriage and minimizing the dependency of 
single parents and their children on state assistance. As a number of 
courts—whether state or federal, and whether operating under state or 
federal constitutional guarantees3—have done in reviewing DOMA, the 
 
† Frederick J. Haas Professor of Law and Philosophy, Georgetown University Law Center. 
1 699 F.3d 169 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 786 (2012). 
2 See id. at 187-88 (rejecting the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group’s (BLAG) argument that 
DOMA advances the goals of “responsible childrearing”). 
3 See Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., 682 F.3d 1, 13-15 (1st Cir. 
2012) (discussing and dismissing various justifications for DOMA); Golinski v. U.S. Office of 
Pers. Mgmt., 824 F. Supp. 2d 968, 991-93 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (discussing the “responsible pro-
creation and child-rearing” argument); Gill v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 699 F. Supp. 2d 374, 388 
(D. Mass. 2010) (“readily dispos[ing]” of the responsible procreation argument); In re Marriage 
Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 431-32 (Cal. 2008) (discussing and dismissing same); see also Litigating the 
Defense of Marriage Act: The Next Battleground for Same-Sex Marriage, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2684, 
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Second Circuit gave the “responsible procreation” argument only cursory 
treatment. Essentially, the Second Circuit reasoned (no doubt, correctly) 
that extending federal marriage benefits to all married couples—both same- 
and opposite-sex—will not affect the incentives of heterosexual couples to 
marry, and therefore should not threaten any state interest in encouraging 
marriage among heterosexuals who, by force of desire or nature, may be 
inclined to produce children as a result of their mutual lust.4 Finding no 
state interest sufficiently compelling to justify what appears to be an 
irrational classification, the court declared DOMA unconstitutional.5  
The Supreme Court may or may not reach the substantive merits of 
Windsor. But if it does, the responsible procreation argument warrants 
greater attention, not because the Second Circuit’s conclusion was wrong—
surely the state’s interest in incentivizing the responsible procreation of 
heterosexuals does not justify the discriminatory treatment of gays and 
lesbians—but because the reason the argument fails is quite a bit weightier 
than the Second Circuit’s mechanical treatment of it suggests. The respon-
sible procreation theory fails not because it is bizarre or incoherent; it is 
considerably more coherent, albeit dated, than either the Second Circuit or 
traditional marriage’s many critics seem willing to admit. Rather, it fails 
because the argument behind it rests on premises that are no longer true—if 
they ever were—and because the exclusions it suggests, however coherent, 
are now simply cruel and unwarranted.  
Just as importantly, although rarely noted by marriage equality’s advo-
cates, the failure of the responsible procreation justification for the exclusion 
of same-sex couples from marital benefits also suggests the irrationality of the 
exclusion of other forms of family—and indeed, of single individuals—from 
this form of federal largesse. In other words, the irrationality of the responsi-
ble procreation argument also highlights the irrationality—and cruelty—of 
governmental preference for married persons across the board and, in turn, of 
civil marriage altogether. I’ll take up these points consecutively.  
 
2699-2700 (2004) (arguing that the state’s asserted interest in responsible procreation is “substan-
tially underinclusive”); Julie A. Nice, The Descent of Responsible Procreation: A Genealogy of an 
Ideology, 45 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 781, 783 (2012) (“The roots of responsible procreation are 
undoubtedly religious, and its presuppositions are in considerable tension with current social and 
legal realities.” (footnotes omitted)); Robert J. Pfister, Marriage Equality in Bankruptcy Court: Joint 
Petitions for Same-Sex Couples, 32 CAL. BANKR. J. 109, 112-15 (2012) (discussing the history behind 
the Obama Administration’s decision to stop defending DOMA’s constitutionality).  
4 See Windsor, 699 F.3d at 188 (arguing that DOMA does not affect heterosexual couples’ 
incentives to enter marriage “in any way”). 
5 Id. 
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I. THE CASE AGAINST RESPONSIBLE PROCREATION 
The problem with the responsible procreation argument6 is not that it is 
incoherent, as was argued by the Second Circuit and by numerous commen-
tators.7 There is nothing incoherent about a social policy that promotes 
raising children in intact families headed by two married partners. After all, 
the contention that children in such families fare better than their peers 
who lack those advantages is supported by an abundance of social science.8 
Nor is there any irrationality in encouraging those who want to engage in 
the kind of opposite-sex sex that creates children to cabin their heterosexual 
sexual activities within those marriages. This, however, presumes that their 
sex leads to children, and that children raised in stable marriages are indeed 
advantaged. It is similarly reasonable to use carrots as well as sticks to 
encourage this form of social organization. In other words, to favor marriage 
over both single parenthood and mere cohabitation by offering federal as 
well as state benefits to the former, but not the latter, is completely con-
sistent with a state policy promoting childbearing within the context of 
marriage. And such favoritism is far less punitive than earlier policies that 
penalized “illegitimate” children both financially and legally,9 that encour-
aged the social stigmatization of unwed mothers (as was commonplace until 
 
6 That is, the argument that the societal need to channel procreative sexuality into marital 
forms, so as to ensure better outcomes for the children who result from that sex, justifies limiting 
federal marital benefits to opposite-sex couples. See Nice, supra note 3, at 783 (“[T]he responsible-
procreation [argument] surmises that same-sex couples already procreate responsibly and that the 
rights and responsibilities of marriage should be limited to furthering the goal of encouraging 
more responsible procreation by heterosexuals.”).  
7 See, e.g., Jacob Combs, Analysis: The Prop 8 Plaintiffs Debunk the ‘Responsible Procreation’ 
Argument for Good, HUFFINGTON POST BLOG (Mar. 1, 2013, 10:26 AM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jacob-combs/analysis-the-prop-8plain_b_2783530. 
html?utm_hp_ref=gay-voices (“This type of ‘reduction to the absurd’ logic points out the central, 
inescapable flaw in the Prop 8 proponents’ reasoning: when you take the issue of sexual orienta-
tion out of the equation, it is fundamentally absurd to limit the institution of marriage only to 
couples who can procreate.”).  
8 See, e.g., LINDA J. WAITE & MAGGIE GALLAGHER, THE CASE FOR MARRIAGE: WHY 
MARRIED PEOPLE ARE HAPPIER, HEALTHIER, AND BETTER OFF FINANCIALLY 124 (2000) 
(reaching the conclusion that “[o]n average, children of married parents are physically and 
mentally healthier, better educated, and later in life, enjoy more career success than children in 
other family settings”).  
9 See For ‘Unwed Fathers’, Laws Are Changing, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30, 1972, at 68 (describ-
ing the various ways that illegitimate children were disfavored before the law, while claiming 
that “[t]he legal relationship between the father of an illegitimate child and his offspring is 
slowly being redefined”). 
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well into the 1970s),10 or that either limited welfare payments to unmarried 
parents or conditioned those payments on work assignments.11 In fact, we 
still limit such welfare payments and have done so since the Clinton 
Administration initiated the policy in the 1990s.12 And of course, under 
current law, we continue to withhold from single and unmarried parents 
various benefits that they would enjoy were they married.13 None of this is 
incoherent. In fact, it all makes perfectly good sense if it is true that chil-
dren fare better in married households, and that heterosexual sex carries 
with it a high risk of conception and procreation.  
Nor is this argument as divorced from our current understanding of 
marriage’s purpose as its critics claim it to be. The Personal Responsibility 
and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA), 14 first enacted 
during the second Clinton Administration and renewed during the Bush 
years, was explicitly aimed at bolstering precisely this understanding of 
marriage. The entire point of that law, as stated explicitly in the law’s 
preamble,15 was to reduce single mothers’ dependency upon government, 
and to encourage in its place dependency upon a husband wage earner in a 
traditional marriage. Marriage was inscribed into that law as the necessary 
moral precondition of child bearing and child rearing, and the host of eco-
nomic incentives and disincentives that the law created were all aimed at 
engineering—or concretizing—that moral connection: if you want children, 
then marry the children’s father. If you have a child and don’t marry the 
child’s father, then you have done something grossly irresponsible, so 
don’t turn to the government for assistance. PRWORA thus represented a 
legalistic reinvigoration of a host of mid-century cultural norms and 
 
10 See Sara McLanahan & Irwin Garfinkel, Single Mothers, the Underclass, and Social Policy, 501 
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 92, 99-100 (1989) (analyzing data from 1980, which 
highlighted the increased social isolation that resulted from unwed motherhood). 
11 See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. 
No. 104-193, § 402(a), 110 Stat. 2105, 2113 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 602(a) (2006)) 
(requiring that all parents receiving assistance under the program engage in work). 
12 See id. § 401(a), 110 Stat. 2105, 2113 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 601(a)) (citing as a 
primary purpose of the Act, the reduction of needy parents’ dependence on government benefits 
through the promotion of marriage). 
13 For instance, the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) requires qualifying employers to 
provide leave to employees in order to care for a legal spouse, but not for an unmarried partner. 
See FMLA Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, http://www.dol.gov/ 
whd/fmla/fmla-faqs.htm#7 (last visited Feb. 17, 2013) (requiring, as a “[q]ualifying condition[]” of 
the Act’s benefits, that the individual cared for be a “spouse, child, or parent”). 
14 110 Stat. 2105.  
15 See 42 U.S.C. § 601(a) (citing, as a primary goal of the Act, “end[ing] the dependence of 
needy parents on government benefits by promoting job preparation, work, and marriage”). 
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practices that had begun to recede in the more “permissive” decades, 
beginning with the 1960s: the stigmatization of illegitimacy; the punitive 
stance toward unwed mothers who were often forced into either life-
threatening back-alley abortions or pregnancies followed by coerced 
adoptions; employment practices toward such mothers, which went some 
distance toward ensuring a life of poverty; the more-than-symbolic laws 
against fornication16 and adultery;17 and the array of state laws establish-
ing a husband’s paternity of children born during the time of the mar-
riage, 18  DNA tests notwithstanding. All of these practices operated 
jointly so as to channel procreative sexuality and the children that 
resulted therefrom into the marital domain.  
Of course, this identification of marriage as the only institution within 
which procreative heterosexual sexual activity could safely—and hence 
morally—occur, was a cultural identification; it was not founded upon a 
dictionary definition and although it was both supported and enforced by 
law, it was not itself inscribed in law. It was inscribed, however—and quite 
firmly—in scores, if not hundreds, of social practices from that time period, 
ranging from childhood ditties (“first comes love, then comes marriage, 
then comes Susie with a baby carriage”), children’s games of “house,” and 
prom night rituals, to tragi-farcical “shotgun marriages” as well as, most 
centrally, conceptions of marital sex as a morally (and legally) obligatory 
duty of wives and an entitlement of husbands, unhindered by conditions of 
mutual consent, pleasure, or desire. “Irresponsible sex” then became, by 
definition, heterosexual sex outside of marriage, while “responsible sex” was 
sex within marriage, and a host of legal, as well as cultural, incentives and 
disincentives directed such sex into the institution of marriage. Have the 
critics and courts that find the procreative responsibility argument so 
incoherent as not to be cognizable19 simply forgotten all of this?  
 
16 See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-6603 (West 2013); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11-
40 (West 2011); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-29-1 (West 2012).  
17 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-13-2 (2013); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-6-501 (West 2013); 
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 798.01 (West 2012); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-19 (West 2012); 720 ILL. 
COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11-35 (West); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 14 (West 2012); MICH. 
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.30 (West 2012).  
18 See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 116, 132 (1989)(holding that a state statute creating 
a rebuttable presumption that a child born to a married woman living with her husband establishes 
the paternity of the husband does not violate principles of due process or equal protection). 
19 See Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 786 (2012) 
(citing with approval other decisions, including Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of Health and 
Human Servs., 682 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2012), and Pedersen v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., C.A. No. 10-1750, 
2012 WL 3113883 (D. Conn. July 31, 2012), which found that DOMA lacked any rational basis). 
13 West Final.docx (DO NOT DELETE)3/26/2013 2:43 PM 
184 University of Pennsylvania Law Review Online [Vol. 161: 179 
 
The problem with the “responsible procreation” argument is therefore 
not that it is incoherent. Rather, the problem is that the entire argument is 
premised on the now-false claim that there exists a strong causal connection 
between procreation and heterosexual sex. Since the invention, development, 
and promulgation of near foolproof birth control, it is not heterosexual sex 
that leads to procreation. Rather, it is uncontracepted heterosexual sex that 
leads to procreation. Nor is heterosexual sex even a necessary condition of 
genetic procreation, given the now commonplace usage of in vitro fertili-
zation (IVF), surrogate pregnancies, and adoptions by same-sex couples of 
children genetically tied to one of the partners. Heterosexual sex, in other 
words, is no longer either necessary to, or sufficient for, the conception of 
children who are genetically connected to the parents who will raise them.  
These technological advancements in reproductive methods have also 
wrought changes in our moral understanding of sex. For most of us today, 
“irresponsible” heterosexual sex is not sex that is outside of marriage. 
Rather, it is heterosexual sex that is either unwanted or nonconsensual, 
that inflicts personal harm or causes injustice,20 or, significantly, that is 
uncontracepted (if no child is wanted). Given the constitutionally 
protected status and widespread availability of contraceptives, marriage 
is no longer needed to serve the state interest that both states and 
BLAG continue to assert21 as the basis for a preference for heterosexual 
marriage: to provide an institutional framework that encourages hetero-
sexuals to engage in responsible sex—that is, sex which leads to children 
with the healthiest life prospects. Therefore, the way to responsibly 
corral heterosexual sex is not by channeling such sex into marriage, but 
by insisting on the use of birth control.  
States’ and BLAG’s continued insistence that marriage is the best way 
to corral heterosexual sex, despite the obvious reality that this function of 
marriage is no longer necessary, is unduly cruel. The sticks once used to 
compel the identification of moral or responsible heterosexual sex with sex 
within marriage—the criminalization of adultery and fornication; the 
 
20 For example, we continue to stigmatize infidelity, defined as sexual activity that violates 
the mutual promises of sexual partners. Additionally, anti-prostitution laws are typically premised 
on the idea that even when prostitutes willingly enter into the sex trade, they endure violence that 
society should not tolerate. See, e.g., Janet Halley et al., From the International to the Local in 
Feminist Legal Responses to Rape, Prostitution/Sex Work, and Sex Trafficking: Four Studies in Contemporary 
Governance Feminism, 29 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 335, 349-51 (2006) (discussing competing 
feminist views on prostitution). 
21 See, e.g., Windsor, 699 F.3d at 187-88 (reviewing and rejecting BLAG’s contention that 
DOMA “facilitates the optimal parenting arrangement of a mother and a father”). 
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financial and legal disadvantage of illegitimate children; the stigmatization 
of unwed mothers; and the refusal, beginning in the mid-1990s, to extend 
the full advantage of state and federal benefits to single parents22—all now 
seem anachronistic and voyeuristic at best and sadistic, rather than func-
tional, at worst. If the purpose of all of this state regulation of family, 
parenthood, and sexuality is to deter childbirth outside of marriage in order 
to avoid the high costs of unplanned children and unwanted or unstable 
families, then the obvious and more effective way to prevent all of that 
irresponsible procreation is by encouraging the use of birth control. Like-
wise, most of us now recognize that there is no longer any good reason 
(although there may be plenty of bad ones) to continue to police extramarital 
sex, to stigmatize unwed mothers, or to penalize illegitimate children. 
Again, to continue to do so is simply cruel.  
This shift in understanding is now squarely reflected in our cultural 
conversations about marriage, sex, and children. Increasingly, we try to 
instill in our children not so much a moral aversion to “sex outside mar-
riage,” but rather, a moral aversion to “irresponsible sex,” understood as sex 
that is either not fully consensual, not mutually desired, or injures third 
parties or the participants themselves, as well as sex that is uncontracepted, 
assuming no pregnancy is desired.  
Sex, then, has not become demoralized, the fears of social conservatives 
notwithstanding. The moral code around sex has not disappeared. It has 
simply changed, and radically so. Marriage is no longer viewed, by many, as 
the moral precondition of sex. This is largely because marriage is no longer 
the only—or even the most optimal—way to ensure that children do not 
unintentionally and irresponsibly result from sex outside of marriage. In a 
post–birth control and post-IVF world—in which the causal link between 
heterosexual sex and the reckless conception of children is broken—it is not 
one’s marital status, but rather consent, desire, the absence of other harms, 
and responsible contraception that have become the moral preconditions of 
responsible sex. And we are all the better for it. 
In fact, with respect to our current moral code regarding sex, marriage 
is simply irrelevant. Sex outside of marriage, as well as sex within it, is 
subject to the same moral constraints. With the advent of birth control, 
legal abortion, IVF, surrogacy, and same-sex couple adoptions, the once 
strong connection between heterosexual activity and procreation has been 
severed. In its wake, the moral connection between marriage and respon-
sible sex has been severed as well. Moral sex—inside or outside of  
 
22 See supra notes 9-12 and accompanying text. 
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marriage—is consensual, desired, harmless to others, and contracepted. 
What’s marriage got to do with it? Nothing. 
Where, then, does this leave the quest for a rational justification for 
the federal government’s refusal to bless same-sex marriages with the 
largesse of federal benefits? On obviously shaky footing. To the degree 
that the protection and promotion of child welfare was once the point of 
civil marriage—and again, I believe there was a time when it clearly was—
that purpose has been undercut not by gay marriage, but by birth control, 
and long before the idea of gay marriage ever entered the picture. If the 
point of marriage is no longer to channel heterosexual sex into responsible 
institutions in order to protect the lives of children whose conception, 
without contraceptives, would have been inevitable, then there is hardly 
any harm done by diluting this purpose, which has long since been swept 
into the dustbin of history.  
There is, then, no longer any legitimate reason to exclude same-sex 
couples from the federally bestowed benefits that accrue to marriage. 
Married parents who adopt, as well as same-sex married couples who avail 
themselves of surrogacy arrangements through the use of IVF, are as 
capable of forming and supporting healthy families from which children 
benefit as are heterosexuals who marry and produce children through 
sexual conception. The intact family, and the stable relationship from 
which children benefit, is not the marriage defined by heterosexual sexual 
activity. It is the family defined by long-term commitment and the 
dedication to raising and caring for children. 
II.  THE CASE AGAINST CIVIL MARRIAGE:  
      WHAT’S SEX GOT TO DO WITH IT? 
The harder, and more troubling, issue that should now be pressing upon 
us is not the one currently in front of the Supreme Court, regarding the 
exclusion of same-sex couples from the financial benefits of marriage. 
Rather, we ought to confront the lack of any clear rationale for excluding 
anyone who is parenting—or indeed, anyone caring for dependents—from 
such benefits. We should be asking, in other words, not only why we are 
excluding same-sex married partners from the federal benefits of marriage, 
but also, why we are refusing to grant these benefits to any others. Why 
should the federal government bestow financial benefits on any married 
partners—either same- or opposite-sex—that are not equally bestowed on 
unmarried persons, who may, after all, also be parenting? If we have turned 
our back on the utility of marriage as a way to safeguard the children that 
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result from heterosexual sex, what other reason might there be for singling 
out married people for the receipt of unique federal benefits?  
The remaining justifications for favoring marriage over other living 
arrangements offer no basis for distinguishing between same- and opposite-
sex marriages. Children do seem to fare better in families led by married 
partners, but this is equally true for children of same-sex partners as for 
those of heterosexual partners.23 If we want to encourage people who wish 
to parent to enter into this optimal relationship for parenting, then we 
might want to favor marriages (of either sort) over other relationships. But 
if the purpose of civil marriage is now the improved life prospects of 
children in intact families, then “marriage” is both over- and under-inclusive: 
plenty of married persons have no desire or intention to parent, and plenty 
of unmarried couples and single people do. If the policy is to be true to the 
facts on the ground, we need a reason to favor not only those married 
people who parent or wish to parent, but to favor marriage per se. Why 
favor married partners over either unmarried partners or single people who 
also wish to establish intact families? And, more crucially, why favor 
married partners who express no intention whatsoever to parent over 
unmarried partners or single people who do possess such desires?  
The only remaining justification, or “point” of doing so, in my view, is 
that the institution of state-governed and state-recognized marriage operates 
fairly well as a semi-privatized social welfare net, which ultimately relieves 
the state of some of its burden of caring for the weak, sick, unemployed, 
or otherwise vulnerable. Married partners do seem to fare better than 
unmarried partners at navigating the vagaries, valleys, pitfalls, and veils of 
 
23 See WAITE & GALLAGHER, supra note 8, at 124-40 (summarizing the advantages that 
children of married parents have over those children whose parents are not married); William 
Meezan & Jonathan Rauch, Gay Marriage, Same-Sex Parenting, and America’s Children, 15 
FUTURE OF CHILD. 97, 104 (2005) (arguing that available data does not support the contention 
that opposite-sex marriage is better than same-sex marriage at furthering the interests of 
children); see also Paul R. Amato, Good Enough Marriages: Parental Discord, Divorce, and 
Children’s Long-Term Well-Being, 9 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 71, 75-76 (2001) (concluding that 
children with married parents fare better than those with divorced parents in terms of academic 
success, conduct, emotional and psychological adjustment, self-concept, and social relations); 
Paul R. Amato, Children of Divorce in the 1990s: An Update of the Amato and Keith (1991) Meta-
Analysis, 15 J. FAM. PSYCHOL. 355, 366 (2001) (concluding that the welfare gap between 
children of married parents and children of divorced parents has widened over time); Robin 
Fretwell Wilson, Evaluating Marriage: Does Marriage Matter to the Nurturing of Children?, 42 
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 847, 879 (2005) (concluding that “a rich literature on cohabiting and 
marital relationships suggests that marriage provides a substrate of relationship characteristics 
among the adults that inure to the benefit of their children”).  
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tears that life presents.24 An important body of research demonstrates that 
married partners better absorb catastrophic losses—such as the loss of a job 
or the onset of a serious illness—than their nonmarried peers.25 As the 
argument goes, they live more cheaply simply by virtue of economies of 
scale, and, by virtue of their long-term commitments, they undertake long-
term projects and apparently plan more wisely for the future. Their lives, in 
short, are more stable—financially as well as emotionally—and for both 
reasons, they are presumably happier. Each of them individually, moreover, 
is less likely to require state assistance to feed, house, educate, or clothe 
their children or themselves. In short, married people are less of a strain on 
state coffers. So long as the cost of giving married people additional benefits 
is less than the savings generated by virtue of their relative financial 
wellbeing, the state’s provision of such benefits is a win all around. Mar-
riage, on this understanding, is not the institution that morally and finan-
cially corrals irresponsible sex. It is, rather, a semi-privatized social welfare 
net that corrals and privatizes caregiving. According to this argument, 
spouses can care for each other better and more cheaply than the state can 
care for either of them. Furthermore, marriage is a privatized social welfare 
net that actually works: it benefits the parties that enjoy it, and saves the 
state considerable costs in the process. 
Clearly—and again, assuming this is the best justification for the outflow 
of state and federal benefits to married couples but not to single individuals 
who also might join or form households for the purpose of bestowing care 
on each other—there is no reason whatsoever for reserving these benefits to 
opposite-sex married couples rather than all married couples. These couples 
are not just similarly situated with respect to this understanding of the 
purpose of marriage—they are identically situated. The exclusion of same-
sex married couples from federal benefits is simply absurd, if the point of 
marriage is to help couples internalize the costs of their own care, thus 
alleviating the state of the burden of caring for those participating in the 
 
24 See WAITE & GALLAGHER, supra note 8, at 32-33 (“Hundreds of studies demonstrate 
that those who feel they have someone they can rely on to help out in times of trouble have better 
mental health and greater well-being.” (citing J.S. House et al., Structures and Processes of Social 
Support, 14 ANN. REV. SOC. 293 (1988))); Linda J. Waite, Does Marriage Matter?, 32 DEMOGRAPHY 
483, 483-507 (1995) (concluding that married people, on average, have longer lifespans, greater 
happiness, greater wealth, and less alcoholism than single or cohabiting individuals).  
25 See WAITE & GALLAGHER, supra note 8, at 31 (“Married people are better off because 
they have someone who will take care of them when disaster strikes. A spouse acts as a sort of 
small insurance pool against life’s uncertainties, reducing the need to protect oneself from 
unexpected events by oneself alone.”). 
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marriage. If this is, in fact, the underlying point of civil marriage, the 
constitutional question raised by Windsor answers itself. 
And that is a reasonable and constitutionally sound resting spot, save for 
one complication. If this is the point of “marriage,” there is also no convinc-
ing reason to limit the understanding of who is and isn’t married, and who 
is and isn’t entitled to the federal and state benefits that flow from that 
status, to couples who join together sexually and perform a ritual for the 
purpose of setting up households of mutual care and provision. If the point 
of the institution—and the point of privileging it economically—is the 
superiority of care that such parties bestow on each other, there is no reason 
to limit either the appellation or the entitlements to couples who have a 
sexual connection. What, after all, has sex got to do with it?  
Rather, it would seem that any two—or more—people who form a 
household and provide for each other, and perhaps for others, the 
requisite care, services, and mutual help that render the married house-
hold optimal for dependents are equally worthy of federal largesse. A 
grandmother and mother who live together and raise the mother’s small 
children, siblings who live together and provide care and support for 
aging parents, friends who come together to provide care and nurturance 
for each other, and surely a single man or woman raising children on his 
or her own—all of these groupings constitute caregiving arrangements 
that internalize, or privatize, the provision of care, thereby lifting the 
burden from the state. As a result, all should presumably be entitled to 
state and federal recognition. If the point of civil marriage is its efficacy 
as a privatized social welfare net, then perhaps all of these units could 
and should be understood as marriages, and should be rewarded with 
federal benefits accordingly. 
I do not mean this suggestion as a reductio ad absurdum. The state’s 
interest in marriage, today, is surely more rooted in the social utility of 
private parties’ mutual promises of long-term care, nurture, and love than 
in recognizing the legitimacy, responsibility, or nature of their sexual 
activities. If so—and if that state interest is rational—then presumably the 
state’s solicitous attitude toward married partners ought to extend to all 
citizens who come together with long-term commitments to each other to 
engage in this vital and loving work. All such persons provide care that is 
of tremendous value to those who receive it, and which, in turn, saves the 
state significant resources. If we reward married couples for this way of 
life because we acknowledge that the care typically bestowed by married 
partners on each other is socially worthwhile (not just to them but to all of 
us), then shouldn’t we also recognize other forms of caregiving commit-
ment, regardless of the caregivers’ sexual relationship or lack thereof? 
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CONCLUSION 
Would it be possible to recognize these other forms of caregiving? What 
would such a world look like? It might not be so different from the one we 
now inhabit. Rather than the federal pension benefits, social security 
benefits, widows’ and widowers’ exemptions, and health insurance benefits, 
with which we now reward people solely for the act of marrying, we could 
instead bestow on all persons who provide to particular others a substantial 
amount of care a federal “caregiver’s benefit,” pegged to foregone income, 
or, perhaps, to need, or to some other metric that strikes our representative 
legislators as fair. Such a benefit would bring our practice more in line with 
the best justification we can articulate in a post–birth control world for 
bestowing so many privileges on married persons. We currently bestow 
these benefits, for the most part, on opposite-sex married partners, regard-
less of their caregiving status, and with no analogous benefit for (though 
perhaps not for long) same-sex couples or (with no change in sight) non-
married people similarly situated in every relevant sense. 
If caregiving is the reason we do so, it is time we consider bestowing that 
largesse on all caregivers, rather than limiting it to one subset of sexually 
active partners whom we allow to sign up for the weak proxy of marriage. 
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